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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance reforms on performance of publicly 
listed firms on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa from 2009 to 2013. 
The study examines the King III reform in detail, and previous reforms before King III. The 
variables employed in this study to measure firm performance are return on asset (ROA), 
return on common equity (ROE) as proxies for accounting based performance measures and 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for market based measure of performance.   
 
 
The results do indicate that corporate governance does have an effect on a firm’s 
performance. Evidence is presented that suggests that the level of compliance has increased 
over the period in question from 2009, when King III was assumed. Overall the conclusions 
are that board size has no impact on firm performance. The hypothesis that board 
independence impacts on firm performance was rejected among other findings. That being 
said, there is also significant deviations from the framework that leave room to further 
develop and/or improve policy. The sample size of 99 is large enough to make inferences 
about the population.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
South Africa is the continent’s economic hub and, accordingly, provides a great testing 
environment to examine this study on corporate governance and firm performance. Unlike all 
its African counterparts, South Africa boasts sound financial and corporate regulatory 
frameworks that mirror western standards. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange is highly 
regulated and unrivaled in Africa, competes with those of western economies like the London 
Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange. Despite its highly accredited association 
and international recognition, the South African stock exchange has seen a decline in ethical 
management behaviours and practices that vary from fraudulent transactions, serious insider 
lending and inadequate capitalisation or market manipulation (Mangena & Chamisa, (2008)). 
Though not exhaustive, these few examples highlight the extent of dishonorable corporate 
governance. Following related cases of corporate scandals and failures, the study examines 
both good and bad corporate governance. The study further addresses the effects of corporate 
governance on an organisation’s financial performance with a focus on economic efficiency 
and sustainability.  
 
This chapter is organized as follow: Section 1.2 presents the context of the study. Section 1.3 
presents the research problems, followed by the research objectives in section 1.4. In section 
1.5 the research questions are presented. Section 1.6 discusses the research gap and finally 
the research methodology in section 1.7.  
 
1.2 Context of study 
At its most basic level, corporate governance deals with issues that result from the separation 
of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, (1979)), (Fama & Jensen, (1983)). This sheds 
light on an agency theory phenomenon or problem that concerns conflicts of interest between 
owners and managers (Eisenhardt, 1989). Studies by various authors including (Douma 
(1997)); (Jacoby (2000)); (Bhagat and Bolton (2008)), (Maignan and Ferrell (2004)) looked 
into the governance models addressing independence of executives, board size, gender and 
diversity etc. Failures in these model aspects were studied in an attempt to evaluate their 
effect on firm performance (Agrawal & Knoeber, (1996)). 
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South Africa is no exception to this. It adopted corporate governance in 1994 with the King 
Report, (Mallin, (2007)), that drew a lot of its fundamentals from the Cadbury report of 1992, 
(Mangena & Chamisa, (2008)). The specific task that the study seeks to address is the 
question of compliance and/or the lack thereof to set frameworks (for example, the JSE 
listing requirements and the institute of directors, King I, II and III on corporate governance 
and the Companies Act 2008) and their collective effect on a firm’s performance. Examples 
of governance failures are the increasing number of firms suspended or delisted from the JSE.  
Statistics data from the JSE customer relations department provide evidence and reveal that a 
sum total of 24 firms were delisted in 2010, 20 firms in 2011, 22 in 2012 and finally 31 in 
2013. Tables A3, A4, A5, and A6 in the appendices provide a list of the suspended or delisted 
firms. Further examples are seen in the construction industry that saw eight of the big players 
admit to fixing prices and collusion for the 2010 soccer world cup development and 
infrastructure projects leading to hefty fines being passed across the industry to the sum of 
R143million by the SA competition commission (FIN24, 25 June 2014). FIN24 (25 June 
2014)  further revealed that some firms like Stefanutti’s borrowed, to pay off their fines, 
while larger firms like Murray and Roberts, Basil Read, Aveng paid their fines from the 
contingencies set aside for this purpose. Following the discovery of these scandals, many of 
these companies saw their stock valuations and prices slide dramatically, the Financial Mail 
reported, “The share price of the Financial Mail's 2013 pick, Wilson Bayley Holmes-Ovcon 
(WBHO), fell 6% during the year. The damage to the reputation of the once well-respected 
company will take longer to reverse after it was slapped with the highest penalty of R311m 
for bid-rigging. Other share price losers include Basil Read (-20%) and Aveng (-13, 6%).”  
  
1.3 Research problems 
Domestic and international cases of bad corporate governance have highlighted current 
regulatory framework inadequacies or gaps that are continually exploited by both private and 
public companies. The level of confidence in the abilities and structures in place to monitor 
and assess compliance has raised concerns within the global financial industry. Limited 
knowledge and empirical reviews on the subject in an African context, particularly South 
Africa, has led to the limited and narrow understanding of the matter locally. Despite being 
adopted from a combined view of the UK Cadbury report in 1994 and the American Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 1997, there still exists clear gaps in the framework of corporate governance in 
South Africa (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008).  
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In light of this, the introduction of the King III report in September 2009 came into being in 
order to circumvent these challenges.  It consists of two main documents, namely, the code of 
governance (The Code), which is a set of principles and the Report, in which it stipulates and 
makes recommendations of best practices for each principle. This was accompanied by the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008. An assessment that provides the understanding of the 
fundamental link and relationship between governance and performance of publicly listed 
enterprises post King III implementation is important. As investors are concerned about the 
effect that these corporate governance structures have on their investments, there is increased 
pressure on the need for regulatory reforms. The problem is establishing the link between 
corporate governance and performance as contrasting conclusions exist in current literature. 
Khatab, Masood, Zaman, Saleem, and Saeed (2011) conclude that firms that have good 
corporate governance practices outperform their counterparts with bad corporate governance. 
In contrast, (P. Klein, Shapiro, and Young (2005) finds that there is no substantial evidence 
that good corporate governance enhances firm performance.  
 
1.4 Research objectives 
The study investigates the relationship between corporate governance measures and firm 
performance within the South African context. The study contributes to ongoing studies 
within an African emerging context, providing significant information that will help in the 
formulation of a comprehensive framework from a pro-active preventative nature, 
encouraging good corporate governance practices and enforcing law reforms for the firm and 
its board members.  
 
The prevalence of corporate misconduct is sufficient evidence to support the need of studies 
of that give clarification to this problem. This study endeavours to institute practices that 
robustly safeguard fair returns on investments and the wider economy in which these 
corporations operate. The study isalso of importance in creating a platform for defining and 
demonstrating the effectiveness of firm internal corporate governance structures, models and 
frameworks as discussed in the King III (2009) report.  
 
The specific objectives are therefore: 
 
 To determine the effect of internal corporate governance structures on firm 
performance of publicly listed firms 
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 To establish the effectiveness of King III internal corporate governance requirements 
for listing firms. 
 To compare the levels of corporate governance adherence across publicly listed firms 
on the JSE main board.  
 
1.5 Research questions 
This research study seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
 Does corporate governance affect a firm’s performance?  
 What is the level of adherence to King III provisions of corporate governance among 
firms listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange?  
 Is the practice of good corporate governance essential in enhancing performance and 
financial stability of a firm?  
 
1.6 Research gap 
Accounting standardisation, along with increased regulatory requirements and disclosures, 
have proven inadequate. The prevalence of corporate scandals due to bad governance is 
justification for the study. Significant attempts are made to furnish stakeholders with 
information on governance and their effect on performance. This study helps add some 
insights into the workings of corporate governance on a firm’s performance and contributes 
to the already existing literature around the subject matter. 
 
Earlier studies in this area have focused primarily on developed economies or developing 
non-African economies ((Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). While they have argued that corporate 
governance is universal, the uniqueness of the African context should be considered. Previous 
studies by (Mangena and Chamisa (2008) focused specifically on listed South African firms 
that have been suspended due to non-compliance with various corporate governance codes 
and practice. A limitation of this study was its focus. It excluded those that were not 
suspended. The current study takes a more universal approach, focusing on all publicly listed 
firms over a 5 year period from 2009 to 2013. A similar study by (Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, and 
Thomas (2012) looked at post-apartheid corporate governance disclosures, along with the 
impact of corporate governance on firm performance. This study however, also looked at a 
sample of firms across the exchange. The sample used is a basis for criticism. This is because 
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samples can look at particular industries or sectors and the findings maybe sector specific. 
Therefore the inferences made are limiting for the wider economy. This study however 
examines a sample of firms equally representative of the JSE over a 5 year period in order to 
produce richer inferences and conclusions.  
 
This study sheds more light into the situation on the ground. Looking at 10 key internal 
corporate governance measures against five performance measures, the study aims to 
ascertain the relationship between corporate governance and performance. The research 
problems articulated above are pursued against the research objectives for the purpose of 
providing a deeper and thorough understanding of the matter from a South African 
perspective.  
 
1.7 Research methodology 
This study uses panel data analysis of the industry over the period from 2008 to 2013. The 
study also follows a similar path as previous studies, using the fixed effect panel Least 
Squares (LS) regression technique to investigate the relationship between firm performance 
as the dependent variable and internal corporate governance structures as the independent 
variable to the regression analysis. 
 
Measures such as Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), are used as proxies for 
accounting based performance measures and the market based measure, Tobin’s Q is used as 
a market measure. This allows for solid results and inferences. These dependent variables 
used as proxies for performance were chosen for their universal use and global acceptance as 
measures of a firm’s performance, alongside their ease to calculate. The independent 
governance measures considered and used in the regression model are board composition, 
diversity, size, and frequency of board meetings, CEO duality or non-duality and many more 
factors.  
 
1.8 Research structure 
A comprehensive literature review in Chapter two outlines evidence of the disintegration of 
good corporate governance practices. The corporate governance structures as detailed in the 
JSE listing requirements and recommendations by the King III report of 2009 are also 
discussed. It progresses to address the fundamental issues underpinning the study of 
corporate governance, being the agency theory and problem. Additionally, the study explores 
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corporate governance models, structures and practices that encompass the ownership 
structure, frequency of the board, executive compensation, board size, independence, gender 
and diversity, to mention but a few variables.  
 
Chapter three shifts focus to address study methodology with particular attention given to 
financial indicators or matrices of a firm’s performance along with corporate governance 
structures and practices.  Then, chapter four presents the descriptive statistics and the 
findings. Chapter five discusses the findings and concludes the thesis and makes 
recommendations for further research. 
 
Chapter summary 
The background of the study is looked at in this chapter. This chapter outlines and 
emphasizes the research problem, research objectives and the reasoning behind conducting 
this study. The following chapter addresses the extant literature. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the extensive literature on corporate governance practices and their 
effect on firm performance and sustainability. There has been extensive academic work 
presented on the relationship or correlation of corporate governance and firm performance, 
with an emphasis on its effect performance or lack thereof. The chapter is organized as 
follows. Section 2.2 discusses corporate governance and firm performance; Section 2.3 
presents a few definitions, followed by the evolution of corporate governance in section 2.4; 
Section 2.5 looks at its importance and section 2.6 addresses the theory behind this study. 
Finally section 2.7 looks at the various corporate governance structures. 
 
Gaps in the fundamentals of corporate governance, namely, legislature as providers of rules 
and regulatory frameworks, audit and accounting as independent assurers to financial 
statement reporting and disclosures, banking as providers of funding and credit and, lastly, 
the society in which they operate, has seen South African firms decline in ethical 
management behaviours and practices, from fraudulent transactions, serious insider lending 
and inadequate capitalization or market manipulation ((Machold, Ahmed, & Farquhar, 2008).  
The study by (G. J. Rossouw, Watt, and Malan (2002) focuses on internal corporate 
governance structures addressing the governance effects on a firm’s performance with a view 
to assessing its economic effect, efficiency and sustainability. Institutions such as 
HealthSouth, Tyco, and WorldCom, Parmalat, Enron took center stage to highlight that man 
cannot be trusted to do right or act with integrity when personal gain and greed is in their 
hearts (Hamilton & Micklethwait, 2006). This gave birth to the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill (also 
known as the Corporate Oversight Bill) passed into law in July 2002 (Rockness & Rockness, 
2005). This type of improvement was meant to impose penalties and restrictions on firms and 
the individuals running them so that individuals would be held responsible in their personal 
capacity, along with their capacity as representatives of the firm.  
 
The scandals concerning bad governance structures and practices, and the subsequent 
corporate failures led to ramifications in the accounting and auditing industry.  Firms like 
Anderson ceased operations completely, for the role they played to enable corporate giants 
Enron misrepresent their financial statements (Imhoff, 2003).  Anderson was a firm among 
the big 5 accounting and auditing firms and today does not exist.  
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The problem however, occurs in the existence of multiple definitions and views of corporate 
governance: an economist’s interpretation of sustainability may relate to an accountant’s 
opinion of assurance, which, in turn, may differ from the views of regulators and views of 
protectors of public interest. To resolve this paradox of conflicting views and definitions as 
well as attempt to address the shortcomings, the South Africa market proactively sanctioned 
the King I, II and III reports that gave stringent guidelines on corporate governance with the 
aim of curtailing immoral hazardous behaviours. This would also set a framework that all 
players would abide by that conforms to business, industry and with a view of economic 
sustainability. Its intent was to curb the immoral self-fulfilling behaviour of agents acting on 
behalf of the principal and was apparently successful. 
 
Firms going public have to comply with the listing requirements set out in the King III report 
as an entry criterion. It is important to exercise caution with such statements as registration 
standards do not in themselves automatically lead to good governance. Mangena and 
Chamisa (2008)’s study of the 81 listed companies that were suspended between 1999 and 
2005 alone supports the need for further inspection of the industry.  Fidentia, Regal Treasury 
Bank and Master Bond were among the firms that brought the limelight onto South Africa 
and its structural corporate governance weaknesses (Sarra, 2004). For example, in the 
Fidentia case, evidence was produced and chartered accountant, Graham Maddock, testified 
that investment money was used to pay employee salaries. This Fidentia case is a good 
example revealing evidence of the effect of failing to adhere to the requirements of having an 
audit committee and the risk and compliance functions of corporate governance (Mangena & 
Chamisa, 2008). This was then misrepresented in the financial statements, a key failing on 
the audit committee function of assurance in their reporting and disclosure. This is a 
requirement of both the King III report and the Companies Act. 
 
A more recent governance issues was that of Nedbank (attempting to enter the African 
markets to compete with counterpart’s Standard Bank and Barclays-ABSA group) and its 
deal with Ecobank smeared with undisclosed reciprocal rights to buy shares in each other’s 
company. This would affect shareholder interest by diluting their holdings and affect the 
ownership structure (Fin 24, 25 June 2014). These dealings did not appear in the financials 
nor were they disclosed to shareholders (Firer & Meth, 1986), (Williams, 1999). 
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2.2  Corporate governance and firm performance 
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998); (Zaman, Hudaib, and Haniffa (2011) linked positive firm 
performance to good corporate governance, while (A. Klein (2002) argued that it was 
attributed to earnings management. This delves further into the competing issues of economic 
performance versus analyst projective performance. Another angle that has been focal to the 
South African context on corporate governance is around competition (Khemani & Leechor, 
2001) and reward/remuneration (Main & Johnston, 1993).  A positive relationship was found 
to exist between corporate governance and share or price performance (Kosnik, 1990). 
Barratt and Korac-Kakabadse (2002) conducted an experiment on corporate governance 
effects on and for the economy. They focused on defining the functionality and role corporate 
governance played in economic efficiency. They concluded that a good corporate governance 
system is positively correlated to financial performance from an association perspective (high 
revenues and profitability). Hence the aim of this study to further investigate the link and 
ascertain the extent of the linkage and bring this to the surface by answering questions like, 
“Is it corporate governance or other factors that affect a firm’s performance?”   
  
The underlying tones in all failures point to the above effects and lead to (G. J. Rossouw et al. 
(2002)) recommendation of improving corporate governance (Governance & Directors, 
2002). The non-synchronistic element of these arenas has seen man take advantage of the 
loopholes in order to profiteer and in so doing, give rise to these scandals. To bridge that gap, 
this study shall focus on the various structures in an aim to uncover reasons and/or early 
warning signals along with determining the extent to which they affect a firm’s performance. 
 
2.3 Definition of Corporate Governance  
There are different definitions put forward to describe the term corporate governance (CG). 
These definitions vary depending on the study being conducted or the scholar conducting the 
study. The definition also seems to differ depending on the country in question. The South 
African view as presented in the King report and derived from the Cadbury report, defines 
corporate governance as “a system by which companies are directed and controlled”  how the 
corporate objectives are set, how the corporate activities and expectations of stakeholders are 
aligned. It is the way in which the affairs of corporations are handled by their Corporate 
Boards and officers (G. J. Rossouw et al., 2002). 
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The organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004) defines corporate 
governance as: “the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate 
affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are 
set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.  
Blair (1995) defines corporate governance as “the whole set of legal, cultural and institutional 
arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, 
how that control is exercised, and how the risks and return from the activities they undertake 
are allocated”.  
 
On the other hand, (Hendry and Kiel (2004) add the aspect of corporate governance as 
emanating from interactions among senior management, shareholders, boards of directors, 
and other corporate stakeholders.  
 
Jesover and Kirkpatrick (2005) sum up the views taken by the above and forge their 
comprehensive view that states that corporate governance involves a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. 
 
From the above broad definitions and for the purpose of this study, corporate governance can 
be viewed as being concerned with issues that include effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, reliability of financial reporting, compliance with laws and regulations, as well as 
safeguarding company assets. Corporate governance, in this study, is viewed as a set of rules 
that define the relationship between stakeholders, management, and the board of directors of 
a company and influence how that company is operating.  
 
2.4 Evolution of corporate governance in different countries 
The academic views useful and key to any study of corporate governance are the Cadbury 
and Greenbury theories. Williams (1999) noted that under the Cadbury proposals, a Code of 
Best Practices embodying underlying principles of openness, integrity, and accountability are 
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articulated and need to be adhered to. This theory states that, public trust in the corporate 
system is meant to be maintained by increasing disclosure to support successful shareholder 
and stakeholder interest-checks against managers (Meek, Roberts & Gray, (1995). 
 
On the other hand, the Greenbury report focused mainly on a small section of the Cadbury 
report and called for the disclosure of directors’ remuneration by detailing each individual 
director’s remuneration. The Cadbury framework proposed to put forward practical ways of 
raising financial control and reporting standards, which could be put into effect without 
waiting for legislation. The increased disclosure requirements aimed to instill public trust, 
which was also seen as a cornerstone and key component to raising and maintaining 
standards. High Quality Financial Disclosure was seen as a means of encouraging effective 
shareholder and stakeholder interest and would facilitate checks and balances against 
professional managers (Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 2006). 
 
Cadbury requires the board to meet as often as possible and retain full and effective control 
over the company, as well as monitor the executive management. The report additionally 
states that there should be clear division of roles and responsibilities at the head of the 
company, for example, the chairman should not and cannot also hold the position of the CEO 
(Chief Executive Officer). The board is required to have a majority of non-executive directors 
who bring an independent judgment. 
 
This mandate has worked very well in the United Kingdom, However it has not been as 
successful in other European countries, a good example being Parmalat in Italy (Rockness & 
Rockness, (2005). In the USA, after a series of much publicized corporate failures in 2000 
involving Enron, Tyco and WorldCom, the Cadbury report was reinforced by the Securities 
Exchange Commission in an attempt to protect investors and society. Laws that have serious 
corporate governance implications were introduced including Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
According to (Puttick, Van Esch, and Van Esch (2008), the Institute of Directors in South 
Africa came up with the King report as a result of a decline in ethical business standards. The 
report advocates an integrated approach to good governance in the best interest of all 
stakeholders. It considered the fundamental principles of good social, financial, ethical, and 
environmental practice of good corporate governance (Governance & Directors, 2002). In 
March 2002, a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct was put forward and applied to all 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, South Africa. This included 
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banking institutions, financial and insurance entities as well as public sector enterprises. The 
current study focuses on the South African context of corporate governance, which arguably 
is an adaptation of the UK and USA, Cadbury and Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
2.5 Importance of Corporate Governance 
The social and economic costs of corporate failures are significant. This includes high job   
losses, the loss of public confidence and the ripple effect a single failure may have in a 
particular market, industry and economy. Poor corporate governance has an impact on 
stakeholders who stand to lose out as a result of mismanagement by directors and managers. 
Good corporate governance needs to be maintained at all times to ensure transparency and 
efficiency in the day-to-day activities of the corporations. This will lead to better access to 
capital, aid economic growth, promote fairness and translates to transparency and 
accountability. Weak corporate governance, on the other hand, translates to waste, 
mismanagement and corruption (Donaldson & Davis, (1991). The following sections will 
outlined this. 
 
2.6 Theoretical underpinning 
Professional managers and directors are employed to handle the affairs of an organization on 
behalf of the owners. In discharging their responsibilities, directors must exercise their 
business judgment in a manner that they believe is in good faith and is in the best interests of 
all stakeholders investors, debt holders, creditors, the board, employees and society in 
general. 
 
However, conflict of interest often arises between the entities and individuals entrusted as 
caretakers. Therefore, there is a heavy reliance on corporate governance structures and 
practices to attempt to alleviate and/or eradicate conflict (Cremers & Nair, (2005).  
 
Corporate governance goes beyond simply establishing a clear reciprocal relationship 
between shareholders and managers. This shall be dealt with further and a deeper look at 
theories, including the agency problem, and supporting theories, in the next section. 
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2.6.1 Agency theory 
At its most basic level, corporate governance deals with issues that result from the separation 
of ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and the contractual view first developed by 
Coase (1937). The Agency theory forges the theoretical framework upon which the current 
study and many others of this nature are based. It proposes that due to information 
opaqueness, the agent is tempted to pursue self-interests to the detriment of the firm and the 
shareholders. This sheds light on a phenomenon called agency problem that speaks to 
conflicts of interest between owners and managers (Eisenhardt, 1989)  and the separation of 
decision making in the firm and its security holders. The theory is applicable in various 
aspects of the business, including accounting. 
 
 Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both 
parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, however, the agent will not always act in the 
best interests of the principal. The theory is concerned with scenarios where the goals of the 
principal and agent are not aligned and the difficulty of the principal to validate this 
misalignment, thus giving rise to agency cost; examples of these are the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss. 
 
Agency cost is the expense incurred by the providers of funds to keep the board and its 
management acting in good faith. Agency theory and cost are the focal and starting point of 
this study of corporate governance as it underpins the concept of corporate governance. 
 
 
2.6.2 Stewardship theory  
Contrary to agency theory, stewardship theory states that executive management is 
intrinsically upright (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). It further states that management should be 
entrusted fully to run firms as they are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them. This 
theory assumes that because executive management spend most of their time in the 
companies that they take care of, they have superior information about both the environment 
they operate in and are more suited to understanding the firms they run, therefore have 
superior decision making capabilities (Donaldson & Davis, (1991).  
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2.6.3 Resource-dependence theory  
The resource dependency theory states that corporate governance mechanisms function as a 
critical connection between the firm and the scarce resources needed to maximise 
performance. This theory is instituted to monitor the effective and efficient governance of the 
board and management, through corporate governance mechanisms like separation of board 
chairperson and the role of Chief executive officer (Strange, Filatotchev, Buck, & Wright, 
(2009). Expert advice, experience, independence and knowledge are necessary skill sets and 
resources the board and its directors should have. Through this experience comes a reputable 
association vital to business continuity. All these connections impact a firm’s performance. 
 
2.6.4 Managerial signalling theory  
Managerial signalling theory is the concluding theory of corporate governance on which this 
study draws. Due to information asymmetry, it is assumed the board and its management 
have access to more and non-public information (Jensen & Meckling, (1979). In support of 
the agency theory, managerial signalling theory is faced with the moral hazard problem that 
the board and its management with their superior information do not use it to the peril of the 
firm.  Adoption and compliance to good corporate governance set guidelines signals 
credibility and safety of investment (Shleifer & Vishny, (1997). One example is seen in the 
appointment of majority independent non-executive directors to the board. This has the effect 
of signalling to investors, both current and potential, its intention of treating them fairly and 
safeguarding their wealth.  
 
2.7 Corporate governance models 
The establishment of roles of the board and senior executives is fundamental to any corporate 
governance structure or model. The board and executive team should present a balance of 
independence, experience and skills on the board in line with the extent and nature of the 
company operations (Maury, (2006). 
 
Douma (1997)); (Jacoby (2000); (Maignan and Ferrell (2004) looked into the governance 
models addressing independence of executives, board size, gender and diversity and other 
factors. The first references of corporate governance were in the 19th century, in response to 
the separation of ownership and control as a result of the formation of joint stock companies, 
which had owners who did not take part in the day-to-day operational issues. They required 
assurances that those entrusted (the directors and managers) were safeguarding their 
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investments and accurately reporting the financial outcome of their business activities. 
Hereto, shareholders were the original center of attention on corporate governance. However, 
contrary to initial schools of thought, current thinking acknowledges a corporation’s 
obligations to the wider society generally, in the form of stakeholders.  
 
2.7.1 Frequency of the board meetings 
This speaks to the number of times the board meets or has meetings. The level of activity of 
the board determines the number of times they should meet. One would be of the view that 
more frequent meetings of the board would allow them to appraise managerial performance, 
review the financial performance of a firm and set strategic direction to ensure its operations 
translate into the financial performance desired of a firm. This is particularly of concern for 
policy makers because of the contrasting views from past research studies. (Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992)) found significance in more frequent meeting translating to higher 
performance as it allows boards to set strategy and appraise management performance 
((Vafeas & Theodorou, (1998). However in a follow up research paper, (Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998)) contended this view purporting a negative association with more frequent 
board meetings, measured against the intensity of board’s activity and/or effectiveness of its 
monitoring function. 
 
According to the King III code of governance, the board should meet at least four times per 
year, once each quarter. The Companies Act and the JSE listing rules, however, leave this to 
the discretion of the firm to formulate a framework that looks at the number of times they 
meet and the agenda. 
 
2.7.2 Composition of the board 
 
2.7.2.1  Board Size 
Board size comprises the optimum number of board members. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
suggested optimal board sizes of about seven to nine directors stating that this enhances time 
taken to make decisions. Their results suggested smaller boards were more efficient than 
larger boards due to processing, control and co-ordinating activities, however arguments have 
been posed that smaller boards can be manipulated (Yermack, (1996); (Kyereboah-Coleman 
& Biekpe, (2007) 
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According to the King III code of governance every board should consider whether its size, 
diversity and demographics make it effective. The framework does not specify a number 
however.  The South African Companies Act suggests that all companies must have a 
minimum of three directors and the JSE listing requirements stipulate four members. 
Minimum number of board members are stated or recommended but provide no indication of 
a maximum number of members.   
 
2.7.2.2  Independence of directors 
King III requires boards to be comprised of a majority of non-executive directors of whom 
the majority should be independent. Independence of directors is assessed by the board 
yearly. For the purpose of this study, independence of directors within the board looks at non-
executive board members. It is a balance of executive and non-executive directors, preferably 
with a majority of non-executive directors (John & Senbet, (1998). A sufficient number of 
these should be independent of management so that shareowner interests can be protected 
(Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, (2000). The Companies Act prescribes that a 
minimum of three non-executive independent directors should exist.  
 
The Board’s independence is maintained by: 
 
 Non-executive directors not holding service contracts and their remuneration not 
being tied to the financial performance of the Group; and 
 All the directors having access to the advice and services of the company secretary 
and, with prior agreement of the chairman, being entitled to seek independent 
professional advice on the affairs of the Group at the Group’s expense. 
 
Non-executive directors are those that bring a strong contingent of diversity of experience, 
insight, and independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources and 
standards of conduct.  
 
2.7.2.3  Board gender, age and diversity 
Variations in the members of the boards of directors in connection with characteristics such 
as managerial background, expertise, age, personality, gender, education and nationality can 
be used to define board gender and diversity (Firer & Meth, (1986). Bhagat and Black (1999) 
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postulate that diversity of the board and its management is essential in order to ensure all 
stakeholders are considered in decision making and its effects on firm performance. Prior 
studies on the effect of board composition had generally adopted one of two approaches. The 
first approach involves the study of how board composition affects the board's behavior on 
discrete tasks, such as replacing the CEO, awarding golden parachutes, or making or 
defending against a takeover bid. This approach can involve tractable data, which makes it 
easier for researchers to find statistically significant results. But it does not give any 
indication of how board composition affects overall firm performance. For example, there is 
evidence that firms with majority independent boards perform better on particular tasks, such 
as replacing the CEO (Hermalin & Weisbach, (1988) and making takeover bids (Byrd & 
Hickman, (1992).  
 
According to the King III code of governance every board should consider whether its size, 
diversity and demographics make it effective. While no prescriptions are set by all or any of 
the governing bodies here, the statement above ensures they carefully consider the 
composition of the board, based on attributes such as experience, age, gender, in carrying out 
their duties. 
 
2.7.2.4  CEO non duality 
To ensure a balance of power and authority, firms need a well-articulated and accepted 
division of responsibilities at the head of the company (Boyd, (1995). Therefore, no one 
individual has unregulated power to make decisions. This is essentially the separation of the 
position of chairperson from that of CEO and is ultimately meant to reduce any agency costs 
associated. The function of chairperson should be completely disconnected from that of the 
Chief Executive Officer. Duality presents profound issues in that the individuals responsible 
for the firm’s performance are the same as those that evaluate its efficiency.  Abor and 
Biekpe (2005) found that firms that separated these two positions are more able to maintain 
an optimal capital structure with debt being used as a control instrument for moral hazard. In 
contrast to these findings, (Donaldson and Davis (1991) found that returns were enhanced 
when there was duality. They further went on to state that combining these roles is more 
suitable in the case of small emerging firms. However, they reasoned that an independent 
non-executive director is to serve as deputy chairman or a strong independent non-executive 
director element on the board. On the other hand, other studies have shown preference is 
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always given to a chairperson being an independent non-executive director (Dalton & 
Kesner, (1987) and these sentiments are shared by many scholars (Boyd, (1995).  
 
According to the King III code of governance, the board should elect a chairman of the board 
who is an independent non-executive director. The CEO of the company is not permitted fill 
the position of chairman of the board. This is corroborated by the JSE listing requirements 
that indicate that the positions must be held by different individuals and that the chairperson 
must be independent. The board should elect a chairperson on an annual basis; however this 
is not a requirement for the position of CEO. The chairman should be an independent 
appointment and justified, if not, in the integrated reports. Section 2.16.7 is of importance and 
states that the CEO should not become the chairman until 3 years have lapsed. The 
chairperson is in charge for the efficient functioning of the board while the CEO is liable for 
running the company's business. 
 
2.7.2.5  Key board Committees  
Key board committees are the audit, remuneration and nomination committees. These 
committees are required to be present by most literature in governance (King III Report, IoD 
(2009). Depending on the firm the risk committee, information technology and governance 
committees are additional committees that could be considered. Because board committees 
are mainly made up of independent non-executive directors (or outside specialist in 
extraordinary cases) the committees are more suited at protecting shareholders’ interests. The 
committees aid in the effective workings of the board.  
 
Audit committees have a major role to play, according to international practice. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA along with the UK’s Smith Report is the leading governance 
frameworks on audit committees. King III requires an independent and suitably skilled audit 
committee. Furthermore audit committees have sanctuary duties in terms of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008, apart from the board. They are set up to give oversight and assurance of 
integrity of the firm’s disclosures of their financial statements and the firms' performance. 
The accuracy of their reporting affects the perceptions of the firm for stakeholders and 
prospective investors. Very little has been covered on the effect of audit committees in the 
literature. The views expressed and recommendations made in the Cadbury report are that 
there should be a small group of non-executive directors to uphold the no conflict of interest. 
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This is the recommendations of the JSE listing requirements. There is very little literature 
exploring this variable and its link to performance. 
 
According to the King III code of governance, the board should delegate other functions to 
well-structured committees but without abdicating their responsibilities. Committees, other 
than the risk committee, should comprise a majority of nonexecutive directors of which the 
majority should be independent. 
 
Section 3.1 of The King III code of governance for South Africa 2009, states that the board 
should ensure that the company has an effective and independent audit committee that should 
meet as often as possible with terms of reference approved by the board. This committee 
should be chaired by an independent non-executive member of the board as this forms part of 
the integral factor of the risk management process. Further, all members of the audit 
committee should be independent non-executive directors. In contract to this, the JSE listing 
requirements state that at least two must be independent non-executive directors. 
 
According to the King III code of governance for South Africa 2009, section 2.25, companies 
should remunerate directors and executives fairly and responsibly. However, there are no 
regulations on what constitutes fair compensation. Further, section 2.25.2 states that the 
remuneration committee should assist the board in setting and administering remuneration 
policies addressing pay basis, bonuses, employment contracts, long term incentive schemes 
and share-based benefits. These should be disclosed in the integrated report and shareholders 
should pass a non-binding advisory vote on the firm’s policy. The committee should consist 
solely of independent non-executive directors. 
 
The King III code of governance for South Africa 2009, section 2.19.1 further states that a 
nomination committee should assist with the process of identifying suitable members of the 
board. This entails conducting background and reference checks and assists in employing 
competent personnel. This requirement has only recently been adopted in South Africa. The 
structures of the nomination committee are similar to those of the audit and remuneration 
committee, requiring at least three independent non-executive directors, led by an 
independent director as chair.  
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Ntim, Opong, and Danbolt (2012) focused on compliance and disclosure of good corporate 
governance post South African independence. However this was prior to the global financial 
meltdown of 2008. They found that corporate governance standards and practices were 
generally improved and positively correlated to financial performance. Their findings echoed 
the same sentiments by (Love (2010). Their research also had practical implication for policy 
makers and regulators that monitor corporate behaviour. Strong measures of enforcement 
need to be put in place and strengthened.  
 
Chapter summary 
The chapter addressed the fundamental issue, namely, agency theory then went further to 
highlight the key corporate governance variables in accordance to King III recommendations 
and the Company’s Act 71 of 2008. The next chapter looks at how the research was 
conducted. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the data used in this research; data sources and research design to 
determine the extent to which corporate governance measures influence the performance 
indicators of firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).  Similar to (Tshipa 
(2012) who investigated a sample of 137 firms listed on the JSE, this study will investigate a 
sample of 99 firms listed on the JSE evenly distributed across the industries, table A1 in the 
appendices shows this. Though different in many respects, it will follow a combined and 
similar approach of governance measures and performance measures as Mangena and 
Chamisa (2008), Gedeon J Rossouw, Van der Watt, and Rossouw (2002) and Tshipa (2012). 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents data and data sources. Section 3.3 
looks at the research design, while section 3.4 looks at the regression equation. Section 3.5 
develops the hypothesis. 
 
3.2 Data 
The performance data, market capitalization and book value of all different types of stocks 
are obtained from Bloomberg Professional databases and Inet Bridge for the research period 
from January 2009 to December 2013. The first data source, the internal corporate 
governance variables and performance variables are obtained from the firm’s annual reports 
published as part of their listing requirements.  
 
The use of panel data analysis should provide a link as to the observed corporate governance 
structures against firm performance over the period 2009 to 2013. The period, though short, 
still allows for robust analytical inferences. The period is from 2009 to 2013, a time that 
allows all firms to fully incorporate and comply with the King III recommendation enforced 
in 2009 or provide some insight and reasoning as to its non-adoption, the ‘apply or explain’ 
philosophy. The research period ends in 2013 which is the most recent period for data 
required and allows for newness and relevance.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the sample comprised firms listed for four or five years 
consistent of the five year period from 2009 to 2013. The final sample of 99 was reached 
solely due to data availability and time constraints. 
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3.3 Research design 
Panel data is used widely in market research to study firm performance, test new products, 
and evaluate promotional campaigns. Panel data analyses data comprising corporate 
governance to the same or similar firms listed on the JSE over more than one time period. A 
panel data study of a sample of JSE listed firms is followed. To put this into perspective, the 
panel data research study attempts to determine whether there is a relationship between a 
firm's performance and internal corporate governance structures over a 5 year time interval. It 
is believed that firms that do better are well governed compared to those that do not. The 
study aims to give evidence of this. Panel data is used to measure changes in firm 
performance of JSE listed firms over time, particularly useful for understanding trends. Panel 
data was used as it allows us to control for variables we cannot observe or measure, like 
differences in business practices across firms. With panel data, we can include variables at 
different levels of analysis (i.e. the corporate governance measures of independence, CEO 
non duality). This is not a perfect modeling technique as it comes with some drawbacks. 
These include data collections issues or, more specific to this study, correlation between 
governance variables. 
 
3.3.1 Dependent variables 
Three measures of firm performance are used as dependent variables and these are 
accounting based measures, market based measure, the risk adjusted measure as performance 
proxies.  First, it will apply accounting based measures, return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity or return on common equity (ROE) as per (Bhagat and Bolton (2008). Second, it will 
employ a market based valuation measure - Tobin’s Q as in Carvalhal da Silva and Leal 
(2005). Net asset Value per share (NAV per share) is used as risk adjusted stock measure of 
performance.  
 
ROA is measured as net income divided by total assets at end of any reporting period. ROA 
is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets, as a percentage. It 
shows how efficient management and/or the firm’s efficiency is in using its assets to generate 
income. The ROA measure is consistent with other studies such as Erhardt, Werbel, and 
Shrader (2003).  
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
× 100 
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ROE is measured as net income divided by shareholders equity. It measures a firm’s 
profitability by revealing how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders 
have invested in the firm. 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 ′𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠)
 × 100 
 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as total market value of a firm divided by the total replacement value 
of a firm’s asset. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost 
of the firm's assets. The Q ratio is useful for the valuation of a company. It is based in the 
hypothesis that, in the long run, the market value of a company should roughly equal the cost 
of replacing the company's assets. Tobin’s Q has been used to explain a number of corporate 
phenomena, for example, managerial compensation and firm performance (Shleifer & 
Vishny, (1997). Tobin’s Q has not been used alone as a measure of performance for its non-
real world decision analysis, because of its limited availability of timeous and accurate data 
in comparison to other performance variables like ROA.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =  
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
It is because of all the shortcomings of each measure of the performance measures described 
above that more than one is used to enrich the findings of the study and account for each 
variables’ shortcoming.   
 
3.3.2 Independent variables 
The corporate governance structures or measures used are board size, frequency of board 
meetings, independence of board members and diversity of board membership along with 
CEO duality and committees. 
 
3.3.3 Control variables  
The control variables that may influence the performance of the firm are size of the firm and 
firm leverage which is measured as debt to equity ratio. Alongside this is its age and 
reputation built over the years. There may be other variables omitted that could either affect 
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corporate governance or firm performance. Taylor, Miller, and Gray (2012) states that there 
will always be omitted variables with a causal effect on the output desired or being tested and 
summed it up by going further to state that there is little that can be done.  
 
3.4 Equation and modeling 
According to the King III recommendations for good corporate governance, the companies 
Act 2008 and the JSE listing requirements combined with information from earlier studies, 
this study derives a practical design offered in the regression model: 
𝑚𝑏𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇1𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇2𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇3𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇4𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇5𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇6𝑏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑡 
 
Where; 
 Mbt represents; Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q, and 
NAV per share for firm i at time t. 
 T1bt  represents Frequency of the board meetings for firm i at time t 
 T2bt  represents board size for firm b at time t 
 T3bt  represents Independence of executives for firm b at time t 
 T4bt  represents Board gender, age and diversity for firm b at time t 
 T5bt  represents CEO non duality for firm b at time t 
 T6bt  represents Key board Committees for firm b at time t 
 Ɛ bt  represents the error term 
 
3.5 Hypothesis development 
 
3.5.1 Frequency of the board meetings and firm performance 
This is the total number of corporate board meetings held in the year. The time used in board 
meetings, determines the performance effect. The agenda, issues raised, discussed and 
reviewed all have an effect on the performance of a firm. If these meetings have no 
meaningful agenda then the outcome will be useless. However if they are well-structured and 
organized, then meaningful decision and strategies will be laid down for the future and help 
keep the firms’ ship on course.  
 
Board meetings are costly in terms of time and money (travel costs, conferencing costs, etc.) 
and, as such, a balance should be reached between the number of times the board meets and 
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the cost inherent with the benefits of a successful meeting. A study by (Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) revealed that more frequent meetings boards are able to lead the organization from a  
strategic direction point along with review performance as it stands, in order to realign any 
variances. As a result, this is tested here. 
 
Hypothesis 1: A statistically positive relationship exists between the frequency of board 
meetings and the performance of a firm 
 
3.5.2 Board size and firm performance 
For the purpose of this study, board size is the number of directors serving or the number of 
Directors on the company's board, as reported by the company (Full time Directors only). 
Deputy members of the Board will not be counted. The board’s capacity for monitoring 
increases as more directors are added, however the benefits may be engulfed by the 
incremental cost of poorer communication and decision making associated with larger 
boards.  Yermack (1996) found that Tobin’s Q deteriorates with board size. In the same light, 
(Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2007) refutes the earlier findings, stating that large boards 
have a more positive effect on firm performance than smaller ones. As a result of these 
conflicting views, this has been included in the variables of this study to examine its case 
from a South African perspective. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A statistically negative relationship exists between the board size and the 
performance of a firm. 
 
3.5.3 Independence of executives and firm performance: 
The number of non-executive directors on the company board of directors reflects 
independence. It includes outside directors in those markets where applicable. Where the 
company has a two-tier board, this field refers to shareholder representatives on the 
supervisory board. Further, the number of Independent Directors on the company's board, as 
reported by the company, is addressed here. Independence is defined according to the 
company's own criteria. An effective board that can both lead and control the company is 
recommended (King III report, (2009). The non-executive directors act as overseers of good 
behaviour and owner’s interest, while the executive directors are better suited to monitor 
business and enhance performance. Independence addresses the issue of associations and how 
these are supposed to be managed with respect to family ties, business connection or past and 
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present colleagues. These members offer the requisite reputable business experience, both 
academic and working expertise and business contacts to ensure the reviewing and 
monitoring mandate is adhered to efficiently and effectively. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A statistically positive relationship exists between the independence of 
directors and the performance of a firm 
 
3.5.4 Board gender and diversity and firm performance: 
For the purpose of this study, gender is looked at as binomial, either male or female. 
Diversity turns to all other factors such as board average age, ethnicity, religion, race, 
professional and technical experience, academic background, life orientation and cultural. 
Here the study will look at the number of female executives and/or female directors on the 
company board, as of the fiscal year.  Executives are as defined by the company, or those 
individuals that form the company executive committee/board or management 
committee/board or equivalent. A board can either be diverse or homogeneous. Diversity has 
the ripple effect of sending a positive signal of inclusive behaviour. This gives the impression 
that all stakeholders in a community and society are fully represented and accommodated. 
However, diversity means embracing differences and listening to all views, opinions, 
interests and prejudices before making decisions which may constrain its efforts 
tremendously. To date, the findings on the relationships between gender diversity and 
performance are inconclusive. For example, (Williams (1999) found a significant positive 
relationship between gender diversity and firms’ performance. In contrast, (Firer and Meth 
(1986) reported a significant negative relationship between gender diversity and firms’ 
performance. As a result of these varying findings, this variable was included in this study. 
 
Hypothesis 4: A statistically positive relationship exists between the board gender, age and 
diversity and the performance of a firm 
 
3.5.5 CEO non duality and firm performance: 
CEO non duality is measured as the separation of the company's position of Chief Executive 
Officer and Chairmanship of the Board, as reported by the company. ‘0' indicates the two 
roles are separate. For the purpose of this study, binomial output will be used with either a '1' 
- Yes or '0' - No. If for any reason the position of CEO is vacant while the chairperson is in 
place, it is assumed that the chairperson assumes the responsibilities of the CEO and in this 
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case, duality would exist. Furthermore, if the position of chairperson is vacant while a CEO 
exists, it is assumed that the CEO takes on the responsibilities of the chairperson until the 
vacancy is filled. Yermack (1996) concluded that the value of the firm and its performance is 
enhanced when there is a separation of these roles. This shall be tested in the South African 
emerging market context. 
 
Hypothesis 5: A statistically positive relationship exists between the CEO non duality and 
the performance of a firm 
 
3.5.6 Committees and firm performance: 
Board effectiveness may not necessarily be affected by its size or composition but by its 
internal administration structure. It can be argued that committees hinder the board and 
management from carrying out their duties freely and affect a firm’s performance negatively. 
Further, they impose an additional cost in terms of time, remuneration and other expenses 
that impact a firm’s performance negatively. An evaluation by (Klein (2002) focused on the 
directors roles within these committees and concluded by proposing committees be filled 
with specialized roles to enhance effectiveness and monitoring. This is tested by the study 
using the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 6: A statistically negative relationship exists between the presence of all 
committees and the performance of a firm 
 
Chapter summary 
The chapter focused on the data and research design. The study draws inferences based on 
data on internal corporate governance variables and financial performance variables. Detailed 
description and in depth explanations on the corporate governance environment in South 
Africa follows. Further, that chapter addresses this environment’s translation to firm’s 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the research design. The hypotheses were introduced and 
discussed in Section 3.6. This chapter presents the research findings and is organized as 
follows: Section 4.1 presents descriptive statistics; Section 4.2 presents the diagnostic process 
followed for the regression which is then followed by presentation of the regression results in 
section 4.3; This is then followed by the discussion of results in relation to hypothesis 
introduced in section 3.6. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.1 and Table  4.2 present the descriptive analysis of our independent and dependent 
variables for the entire period and for the year on year from 2009 to 2013. Most of our 
variables are close to being normally distributed except for CEO duality, committees and firm 
performance, ROE, ROA and Tobin Q which have skewness of 22.249, 7.697, 14.171, 8.369 
and 13.959 respectively.  
 
The summary statistics for the period are displayed in the tables below, table 4.1 and 4.2. A 
comprehensive description and discussion of the individual variables follows the summary 
statistics for the period and year on year. 
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Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics of the specific dependent and independent variables for the entire period for the sample. 
   MEETINGS   SIZE   INDEP   NON_EXEC   WOMEN   AGE   CEO   COMM   ROA   ROE   TOBIN_Q  
 Mean  5.921 12.077 6.632 8.836 1.962 55.552 0.002 0.016 0.092 0.208 1.949 
 Std Error  0.092 0.152 0.108 0.126 0.057 0.166 0.002 0.006 0.015 0.018 0.199 
 Median  5.000 12.000 6.000 9.000 2.000 55.454 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.165 1.313 
 Mode  5.000 9.000 5.000 10.000 2.000 54.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.092 2.609 
 Std Dev  2.039 3.387 2.412 2.794 1.265 3.689 0.045 0.126 0.329 0.405 4.426 
 Sample Var  4.158 11.472 5.816 7.805 1.600 13.606 0.002 0.016 0.108 0.164 19.593 
 Kurtosis  6.584 0.033 0.070 0.144 0.042 0.915 495.000 57.483 232.266 106.610 206.860 
 Skewness  1.951 0.592 0.485 0.537 0.332 -0.130 22.249 7.697 14.171 8.369 13.959 
 Range  16.000 18.000 13.000 16.000 6.000 27.670 1.000 1.000 6.293 7.474 68.684 
 Min  3.000 6.000 2.000 3.000 0.000 40.000 0.000 0.000 -0.302 -1.376 0.149 
 Max  19.000 24.000 15.000 19.000 6.000 67.670 1.000 1.000 5.992 6.098 68.834 
 Sum  2,931 5,978 3,283 4,374 971 27,498 1 8 46 103 965 
 Count  495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 
 
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics of the specific dependent and independent variables year on year from 2009 to 2013 
      2009            2010            2011            2012            2013    
   Mean   std dev   Mean   std dev   Mean   std dev   Mean   std dev   Mean   std dev  
 MEETINGS      6.000      2.241          6.162          2.498          5.737          1.747          5.737          1.782          5.970          1.826  
 SIZE   12.242      3.597        12.263          3.573        12.051          3.403        11.848          3.189        11.980          3.201  
 INDEP      6.323      2.519          6.586          2.611          6.636          2.314          6.717          2.304          6.899          2.306  
 NON_EXEC      8.737      2.940          8.838          2.958          8.818          2.837          8.848          2.712          8.939          2.555  
 WOMEN      1.798      1.245          1.859          1.254          2.071          1.303          2.030          1.273          2.051          1.248  
 AGE   54.696      3.659        55.195          3.821        55.404          3.492        56.062          3.608        56.405          3.674  
 CEO             -               -                   -                   -                   -                   -            0.010          0.101                 -                   -    
 COMM      0.051      0.220          0.010          0.101          0.010          0.101          0.010          0.101                 -                   -    
 ROA      0.105      0.348          0.137          0.602          0.096          0.199          0.069          0.101          0.053          0.094  
 ROE      0.224      0.393          0.267          0.631          0.225          0.370          0.184          0.236          0.139          0.268  
 TOBIN_Q      2.375      6.751          2.295          6.796          1.692          1.315          1.785          1.983          1.600          0.907  
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The data is further described graphically below. 
 
4.1.1 Frequency of the board meetings 
About 5.91 is the mean frequency of board meeting for the period from 2009 to 2013. Figure 
4.1 shows that over the years the frequency of board meetings increased before decreasing 
and rising again to an average of 5.97 as depicted below. King III and the JSE listing 
requirements mandates boards to meet at least once a quarter which equates to four times a 
year. 
 
Figure 4.1 
 
 
4.1.2 Board Size 
The highest average board size was 12.263 in 2010, while the lowest Board size average of 
11.848 was observed in 2012.  
 
Figure 4.2 
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4.1.3 Independence of directors 
Figure 4.3 shows that independent board membership increased progressively year on year 
from 6.323 in year 2009 to 6.899 in 2013. This reflects a linear increase of 9.1% over the 
period. Similarly, figure 4.4 shows that non-executive membership increased from 8.737 to 
8.939 on average across the sample period. It is particularly interesting that more than half 
the board membership is filled by non-executive directors with the majority being 
independent.  
 
Figure 4.3 
 
 
Figure 4.4 
 
 
4.1.4 Board diversity (gender and age) 
Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show that both average board age and gender matrix increased. A main 
contribution to this is the aging population on the board and the general adoption of BBBEE 
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codes of good practice. For this study, diversity looks at age and gender. However, boards are 
to ensure diversity in terms of skills, experience and qualification and demographics. 
Figure 4.5 
 
 
Figure 4.6 
 
 
4.1.5 CEO non duality 
Figure 4.7 shows that, with the exception of year 2012 there was generally, no duality over 
the sample period   
 
Figure 4.7 
 
 1.798  
 1.859  
 2.071  
 2.030   2.051  
 1.600
 1.700
 1.800
 1.900
 2.000
 2.100
1 2 3 4 5
YEAR 
WOMEN
 54.696  
 55.195  
 55.404  
 56.062  
 56.405  
 53.500
 54.000
 54.500
 55.000
 55.500
 56.000
 56.500
 57.000
1 2 3 4 5
YEAR 
AGE
 -
 0.005
 0.010
 0.015
1 2 3 4 5
CEO 
CEO
 Page | 33  
 
 
 
4.1.6 Key board Committees  
King III and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 together require listed firms to set up audit, risk, 
remuneration and nomination committees. This has almost been applied in totality by all 
firms in the sample. The decrease reflects this as presence of all was 0 while 1 was 
representative of a missing committee. 
 
4.2  Regression diagnostic testing 
In order to run any least squares regression analysis, a few assumptions had to be met and 
corrected for in the panel data. The assumptions were linearity, normality, multicollinearity 
and homoscedasticity. A series of tests were conducted and the data corrected for the least 
squares assumption before running the final regression and presenting the findings. 
 
Firstly, the individual variables are tested for significance. A squatter plot of each individual 
variable was developed and outliers were eliminated, that left us with a sample of 99 listed 
firms, from a pool of 380 in the listed firm’s population. Further, the correlation matrix below 
was done repeatedly removing outliers in the data sets that required extra modelling and 
fixing in order to be included. The presence of negative values and/or extreme deviations to 
norm based on either economic specific condition like the long mining strike and scandals in 
the construction industry would yield abnormal returns or results and as a result, inferences 
could not be made on the population at large. This of course means the study might omit 
important explanatory variables. This is noted and ignored for the purpose of this study. As a 
development to this study, one could assess the impact of eliminating such variables. Once 
this is done the study looks at the key features of a good regression model.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables included in the model. 
The table shows a very low correlation coefficient of the independent variables after firstly 
removing the outliers and then first differencing with only Non-Executive and firm size 
having a correlation 0.872, indicating there is a marginally insignificant multicollinearity 
issue with the data (that same variables are correlated). The correlation statistic of 0.872 
which is greater that the test statistic of 0.8 can safely be ignored as long as there is no 
autocorrelation, something that is corrected for by using first differencing of the data. 
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Important to note in the matrix is that the key board committees are negatively related to all 
the other independent variables. 
 
Table 4.3 Correlation Matrix of the variables used in the regression analysis 
   MEETINGS   SIZE   INDEP   NON_EXEC   WOMEN   AGE   CEO   COMM  
 MEETINGS             1.000  
        SIZE           -0.006    1.000  
       INDEP             0.064     0.708    1.000  
      NON_EXEC             0.072     0.872     0.774             1.000  
     WOMEN             0.020     0.470     0.462              0.470         1.000  
    AGE             0.053     0.157     0.322              0.205          0.016    1.000  
   CEO             0.002     0.052     0.044              0.083          0.037     0.047    1.000  
  COMM           -0.089   -0.117    -0.127             -0.130         -0.047   -0.019   -0.006      1.000  
 
To do away with multicollinearity, the study looked at the first differences of all our variables 
and regressed them using panel fixed effect and not panel random effect regression modeling 
analysis. The obvious solution would have been to log the data, however, due to presence of 
non-positive values, this was not possible. Because the random effect regression model failed 
to produce a test statistic that can be accepted at the 5 percent confidence level, we went 
ahead with the fixed effect panel regression model at first differences. I performed the 
Hausman specification test on our random effect panel regression to differentiate between the 
fixed effects model and the random effect. Because the random effect model had a “p” value 
greater than 0.05, (0.7123), we reject the null which states that the random effects model fits 
well with the data. The study found a statistically insignificant “p” value test showing that we 
reject the favoured null hypothesis of random effects and concluded that fixed effects model 
is the most appropriate for our data. The study uses the fixed cross section specification for 
our regression to remove the autocorrelation and the multicollinearity that may arise due to 
time invariant repeat independent values. 
 
We tested for a unit root using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test and all our independent 
variables had a t statistic which was far more negative than the critical values, indicating that 
they all had no unit root and that they are all stationary and the regression can proceed. 
 
We used the Durbin Watson test and the correlogram to test for autocorrelation and found no 
autocorrelation in our error terms except for CEO non-duality which we corrected for by first 
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differencing. To check for correctness of the data using this test, the results must yield a 
statistic above 1.5 and as close as possible to 2, which was observed in the final regression 
and allowed for interpretation of the data. The regression results are presented below. 
 Page | 36  
 
Table 4.4 Summary of the hypothesis tests results 
  ROE ROA TOBIN'S Q 
  
Hypothesis Regression Statistical Hypothesis Regression Statistical Hypothesis Regression Statistical Hypothesis 
sign result significance Decision result significance Decision result significance Decision 
   of results     of results     of results    
BOARD_MEETINGS 
+ - INSIG Reject + SIG Accept + SIG Accept 
PER_YR 
BOARD SIZE - + INSIG Reject - INSIG Reject + INSIG Reject 
INDEPENDENT 
+ - INSIG Reject - INSIG Reject - SIG Reject 
DIRECTORS 
# NON 
+ - SIG Reject - SIG Reject - SIG Reject 
EXECUTIVE 
# WOMEN 
+ + INSIG Reject + SIG Accept + SIG Accept 
ON_BOARD 
BOARD 
+ - INSIG Reject - INSIG Reject - INSIG Reject 
AVE_AGE 
CEO NON 
+ + SIG Accept + SIG Accept + SIG Accept 
DUALITY 
COMMITTEES - - INSIG Reject - INSIG Reject - INSIG Reject 
           
*INSIG = Insignificant         
**SIG= Significant at either 1%, 5% or 10% 
 
     
Hypothesis 1: A statistically positive relationship exists between the frequency of board meetings and the performance of a firm 
Hypothesis 2: A statistically negative relationship exists between the board size and the performance of a firm. 
Hypothesis 3: A statistically positive relationship exists between the independence of directors and the performance of a firm 
Hypothesis 4: A statistically positive relationship exists between the board gender, age and diversity and the performance of a firm 
Hypothesis 5: A statistically positive relationship exists between the CEO non-duality and the performance of a firm 
Hypothesis 6: A statistically negative relationship exists between the presence of all committees and the performance of a firm
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As revealed in  table 4.5 and 4.6, in order for us to successfully make inferences of the 
results, the regressions needed to meet certain features for a good regression model. These 
included the regression line being strongly fitted to the data represented by an R squared 
value greater than 60 percent. This is the case for my outputs and allows me to proceed. The 
second feature is that the independent variables should be individually significant to explain 
the dependent variable observed in the t test. This was already tested for prior to running the 
regression. The third feature is that the independent variables should be jointly significant to 
explain the dependent variables and this is observed in the f test. The residuals must not be 
autocorrected, a feature already corrected for in the preliminary tests above using the 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test. Lastly, the variances of the residuals are 
homoscedastic and not heteroscedastic. This is confirmed using the Breusch-Pegan-Godfrey 
test. With all these features observed, the data is normally distributed and as such indicates 
that the regression is a good model where the independent variables can explain the 
dependent variables to the regression model. The results are presented and discussed below. 
 
4.3 Impact of governance on accounting based measures of performance 
Table 4.5 shows the explanatory value of the independent variables to the variation of the 
dependent variables, ROE and ROA is 67.86% and 78.87% respectively seen by the R 
squared value. The dependent variables ROA and ROE are explained 67.86% and 78.87% 
accurately by the independent variables in the model. 
 
Table 4.4 shows us that the number of board meetings (MEETINGS) per year has a 
statistically positive relationship to the performance of a company as shown by our results 
with a p-value of 0.0448 which is statistically significant at the 5%. We therefore accept the 
null hypothesis that there exist a statistically positive relationship between the frequency of 
board meetings and the performance of a firm. Despite this being the case for ROA, ROE 
reveals the opposite result. The relationship is not positive and the p-value is not significant at 
0.2316. In this case, we therefore reject the null in this case. 
 
Using ROA as our proxy for performance, the board size (SIZE) has a negative relationship to 
a firm’s performance as indicated by the negative co-efficient of -0.000508. Although the 
relationship is in tandem with the hypothesis, the results are not statistically significant as 
shown by a p-value of 0.9688. This suggests that we therefore reject the hypothesis that a 
statistically positive relationship exists between the board size and the performance of a firm. 
 Page | 38  
 
On the other hand, the relationship observed using ROE as a proxy is positive and the p-value 
insignificant, 0.6262, we therefore reject both the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 4.5 shows a negative relationship between the number of independent directors 
(INDEP) and the performance of a firm, as shown by a p-value of 0.127 and 0.5418 which is 
not statistically significant for ROA and ROE respectively. We therefore reject the null 
hypothesis that there exists a positive relationship between the independence of directors and 
the performance of a firm. These finding are in sync with the findings of (Zaman et al. (2011) 
and (Tshipa (2013), but goes against the findings of Williams (1999), Mangena and Chamisa 
(2008) which found a positive relationship existing between the number of independent 
directors and the performance of a firm. Similarly the p-values are significant for non-
executive director membership (NON_EXEC) which is 0.0004 and 0.0081 for ROA and ROE 
respectively. Despite the statistically significant p-value, the relationship is negative; we 
therefore fail to accept the hypothesis that there is a statistically positive relationship. 
 
The results for the number of women (WOMEN) on boards and its relationship to 
performance is highly positive and statistically significant as shown by a p-value of 0.0016 
for ROA but insignificant statistic for ROE, 0.2309. As a result we accept the hypothesis for 
ROA and reject for ROE. The board average age’s (AGE) relationship with a firms’ 
performance is negatively related for both ROA and ROE. With p-values of 0.2365 and 
0.2942 respectively, this indicates statistical insignificance. The hypothesis is therefore 
rejected in both instances. These findings are in line with studies by (Erhardt et al. (2003) that 
found a negative relationship between board diversity and a firms’ performance. 
 
CEO non-duality’s (CEO) relationship with a firm’s performance is positive and statistically 
significant for both accounting measures ROA and ROE, as shown by a p-value of 0.0142 
and 0.0757. We therefore fail to reject this hypothesis. Unlike CEO non duality (CEO), the 
presence of all committees (COMM) has a negative relationship with a firms’ performance.  
Though the negative relationship is observed that fits the assumptions of this study, the p-
values are not statistically significant at 0.268 and 0.4153 for ROA and ROE respectively. 
While the results capture the relationship correctly, the p-values are insignificant and 
therefore we reject the hypothesis. 
 
 
 Page | 39  
 
Table 4.5 Relationship between firm performance and governance  
Panel A: Dependent Variable: ROA 
Method: Panel Least Squares   
  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
INTERCEPT 1.493414 1.177653 1.268127 0.2058 
MEETINGS 0.00422 0.002094 2.015662 0.0448** 
SIZE -0.000508 0.012948 -0.039202 0.9688 
INDEP -0.01608 0.010331 -1.556418 0.1207 
NON_EXEC -0.017739 0.004928 -3.599334 0.0004*** 
WOMEN 0.018167 0.005693 3.191382 0.0016*** 
AGE -0.021378 0.018021 -1.186298 0.2365 
CEO 0.081012 0.032838 2.467016 0.0142** 
COMM -0.027481 0.024762 -1.109807 0.268 
R-squared 0.678597 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.560712 
   S.E. of regression 0.241547 
   Sum squared resid 16.86163 
   Log likelihood 63.06227 
   F-statistic 5.75644 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0 
       Durbin-Watson stat 1.980443       
     Panel B: Dependent Variable: ROE 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
INTERCEPT 1.351293 1.045499 1.292485 0.1972 
MEETINGS -0.004271 0.003563 -1.198761 0.2316 
SIZE 0.007733 0.01586 0.487581 0.6262 
INDEP -0.008882 0.014541 -0.61081 0.5418 
NON_EXEC -0.028656 0.010746 -2.666699 0.0081*** 
WOMEN 0.018031 0.015019 1.200584 0.2309 
AGE -0.016603 0.0158 -1.050863 0.2942 
CEO 0.136412 0.076518 1.782748 0.0757* 
COMM -0.025069 0.030732 -0.815712 0.4153 
R-squared 0.788797 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.711331 
   S.E. of regression 0.231652 
   Sum squared resid 15.50849 
   Log likelihood 79.62559 
   F-statistic 10.18256 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0 
       Durbin-Watson stat 2.131463       
     ***significant at 1% 
    **significant at 5% 
    *significant at 10% 
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4.4  Impact of governance on market based measures of performance 
The explanatory value of the independent variables explaining the variation of the dependent 
variable is 70.30% seen by the R squared value. The dependent variable, Tobin’s Q is 
explained 70.30% accurately by the independent variables in the model. 
 
Table 4.6 shows the relationship between governance measures and the market based 
measure of performance that reveals a statistically significant positive relationship between a 
firm’s frequencies of board meetings and a firm’s performance with a p-value of 0.077. The 
hypothesis which states that there is a positive relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings (MEETINGS) and the performance of a firm is supported empirically by these 
findings and as such is accepted. The statistically significant positive relationship between the 
number of board meetings (MEETINGS) and the firm’s performance is seen in the studies by 
(Mangena and Tauringana (2006), (Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), (Arora (2011), (Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) and (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002). A positive coefficient is 
in agreement with the King III report that there should be a significant number of board 
meetings in a year. Tshipa (2013) found a positive relationship between the number of board 
meetings (MEETINGS) and the firm’s performance, although his findings were statistically 
insignificant.  
 
There is a statistically insignificant positive relationship between a firm’s board size (SIZE) 
and the market performance with a p-value of 0.5476. Though the findings are not 
statistically significant the positive coefficient is in conflict with the negative link stipulated 
in the hypothesis as was found by (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2007) and (Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992). We therefore reject the null hypothesis that there is a negative relationship 
between the board size and the performance of a firm (Table 4.6).  
 
The results reveal a negative relationship exists between the independent of directors 
(INDEP) and market based performance.  Although it is statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.0006, it is against the framework set out in the King III on best practice. This result 
questions the practices of firms in the South African economy and allows for improvement in 
policy. The number of non-executive (NON_EXEC) directors on a board has a statistically 
significant negative relationship with a firm’s performance. Therefore we reject the forth 
hypothesis that states that there exists a positive relationship between the independence of 
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directors and the performance of a firm. This is against the findings of Dalton and Kesner 
(1987)  and Boyd (1995). 
 
The number of women (WOMEN) on boards has a statistically significant positive 
relationship with a firm’s performance, p-value of 0.0147. Similarly this was revealed in the 
study by (Firer and Meth (1986) and (Bhagat and Bolton (2008). Therefore the hypothesis 
that states that there is a positive relationship between board diversity and performance is 
accepted. In total contrast to this hypothesis are the findings on board age, that revealed a 
negative relationship but with an insignificant p-value of 0.441. In this case the hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Our study finds a statistically significant positive relationship between CEO non-duality and 
a firm’s market performance in line with the studies of (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2007), (Dalton and Kesner (1987) and (Boyd (1995). We therefore accept our null 
hypothesis number 5 (See Table 4.6).  The relationship between the boards Committees 
(COMM) has a negative relationship to a firm’s performance with a high p value of 0.192 
showing high insignificancy statistically. This finding is consistent to major studies showing 
an empirically statistically negative relationship between Tobin Q and board committees 
(Vafeas & Theodorou, (1998). 
 
Table 4.6 Relationship between firm performance and governance  
Dependent Variable: TOBIN's Q 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
INTERCEPT 12.42384 12.91775 0.961765 0.337 
MEETINGS 0.074022 0.041713 1.774533 0.077* 
SIZE 0.125181 0.207936 0.602016 0.5476 
INDEP -0.245297 0.070336 -3.487496 0.0006*** 
NON_EXEC -0.275857 0.138783 -1.987686 0.0478** 
WOMEN 0.165543 0.067425 2.455237 0.0147** 
AGE -0.155664 0.201748 -0.771579 0.441 
CEO 0.426494 0.121361 3.514249 0.0005*** 
COMM -0.287396 0.219785 -1.307626 0.192 
R-squared 0.703036 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.594116 
   F-statistic 6.45456 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0 
       Durbin-Watson stat 1.520467       
***significant at 1% 
    **significant at 5% 
    *significant at 10% 
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     Chapter summary 
A presentation of the descriptive statistics depicting the level of compliance to frameworks 
set and then a discussion of corporate governance measures in relation to various 
performance measures was followed with a look at the hypothesis test results. The next 
chapter discusses these findings in relation to theory. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 discusses the results in relation to existing 
literature; Section 5.3 concludes and highlights some recommendations that can be explored 
for future studies. 
 
5.2 Discussion 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current situation in the South African market, of 
the relationship of corporate governance and a firm’s performance of a sample of listed firms 
on the JSE. The extant literature on corporate governance has not adequately covered several 
aspects on compliance with guidelines set out by the Companies Act and the King III report. 
One of the most important questions in corporate governance is whether or not the current 
governance framework is sufficient to ensure ethical and moral behavior. More importantly, 
it is not whether or not governance contributes to financial performance, but rather to what 
extent it contributes to financial performance. 
 
Our ROA, ROE and Tobin Q results are in tandem with accepting the null hypothesis that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between CEO non-duality and a firm’s 
performance in relation to the findings by (Arora (2011) and (Tshipa (2013). The opposite 
view to this study were seen in the study by (Mangena and Chamisa (2008). The positive 
coefficient of CEO non-duality strengthens the idea and recommendation of the King III 
report that the role of CEO and Chairperson should be separated. This allows division of 
responsibilities and aids in accountability and reporting fairly on operations. Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) posit that returns are enhanced when there is no separation of roles of CEO and 
chairperson but this is in contrast to resulting behaviours observed as in the Parmalat case. 
  
The ROA and Tobin’s Q measure of performance are in agreement with the hypothesis and 
proved empirically to be statistically significant. The results also revealed a positive 
relationship between the frequency of board meetings (MEETINGS) and the performance of 
a firm. This is in total conformity with the King III report that there should be a significant 
number of board meetings in a year. This allows for review of performance and realignment 
of variances if any accordingly during the financial period in question. Studies by (Mangena 
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& Tauringana (2006)), (Karamanou and Vafeas (2005)) and (Arora (2011)), (Vafeas 
(1999a)), (Fich and Shivdasani (2006)) and (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley, (2002)) 
agree with this framework and, as such, from a policy perspective, this seems to be working. 
However, if one looks at the case of African Bank Investment limited, that had more 
meetings but still yielded poor or negative performance results, clearly one can see that in 
times of crisis, these theoretical norms do not apply. Although (Tshipa (2013) found a 
positive relationship between the number of board meetings and the firm’s performance, his 
findings were statistically insignificant. This could be explained by the time difference in 
study periods. This paper mainly looks at the time period post King III in 2009 while (Tshipa 
(2013) mainly focused on the 10 years leading up to 2009. 
 
In agreement with (Lipton and Lorsch (1992), this study found  empirical evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis that a statistically positive relationship exists between the board size and 
the company performance. This study’s results were not statistically significant and the 
positive coefficient is in contrasting view to the findings of the market based measure, 
Tobin’s Q, that revealed a statistically significant negative link between board size 
(Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, (2007).  
 
The study by (Adler (2001) suggests that that board diversity impacts positively on 
accounting measures of performance, but this study’s ROE results reveals that we reject our 
null hypothesis that a statistically positive relationship exists between board gender, age and 
diversity and the performance of a firm. In contrast, the study by (Erhardt et al. (2003) found 
a negative relationship between board diversity and a firms’ performance corroborating our 
findings. 
 
In conjunction with studies by (Boyd (1995), this study also rejects the null hypothesis of a 
statistical positive relationship between the independence of directors and the performance. 
However this is in contrast to the view of policy makers that govern the way firms are 
monitored and operate, as seen in King III. Of course, scholars like (Dalton and Kesner 
(1987) are in agreement with the King III recommendation that favours a situation where a 
Chairperson be an Independent Non – Executive Director. This might be accounted for in the 
differences in geographic location and or economic environments the firms operate in.  
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This study supports a few of the studies already done in an African context but differ mostly 
in that South Africa is a developing economy, yet other scholars looked at developed 
economies and this has a key role to play in the different results observed.  
 
5.3 Conclusion and recommendations 
This paper makes a significant contribution by addressing these key factors post 
implementation of the King III guidelines that imposed stricter disclosure measures and 
governance of public listed firms on the JSE. It is the first to explore the situation on the 
ground with regards to compliance and adoption of frameworks imposed, along with an 
assessment of their effect on performance. However, time and data availability limited the 
depth of the study; As a result, the regression model had only six fundamental governance 
factors, yet the corporate governance spectrum has several other factors that could be 
explored. 
 
Our study will add value to the existing literature in the findings of corporate governance 
factors and support a significant frequency of board meetings, board gender, age, diversity, 
CEO Non Duality to aid and improve performances through good corporate governance of 
South African based corporations and the world over.  
 
An interesting future research agenda would be to find possible explanations for these 
contrasting results, starting with why we get positive relationships in one economy and 
negative relationships in the next or between sectors or industries. Put differently, an 
explanation why some factors are significant in one context and insignificant in another. A 
similar study can be carried out in Southern African countries like Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Zambia, Angola and Mozambique to aid the literature of Corporate Governance factors in 
developing countries. 
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APPENDICES A 
Table A1: Industry classification for the sample 
No. Industry Super Sector Sector # of firms 
% of  
Sample 
1 Oil and Gas Oil and Gas 
Oil and Gas Producers 
3 3 
Oil Equipment, Service and Distribution 
Alternative Energy 
2 Basic Materials 
Chemicals Chemicals 
18 18 
Basic Resources Forestry and Paper 
  Industrial Metals and Mining 
  Industrial Goods and Services 
3 Consumer Goods 
Automobiles/parts Automobiles and parts 
10 10 
  Food Producers and beverages 
Personal and  
Households Goods 
Household Goods and Home Construction 
leisure/Personal Goods 
Tobacco 
4 Healthcare Healthcare 
Healthcare Equipment and Services 
5 5 Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 
5 Consumer Services 
Retail Food and Drug Retailers 
15 15 
  General Retailers 
Media 
Broadcasting and Entertainment 
Media Agencies/publishing 
Travel and Leisure Travel and Leisure 
6 
Telecommunications 
& 
Technology 
Telecommunications 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 
  
5 
Mobile Telecommunication 
Technology 
Software and Computer Services 
5 Technology Hardware and Equipment 
7 Financials 
Banks Banks 
21 21 
Insurance 
Nonlife Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Financial Services Financial Services 
Investment 
Instruments Equity Investment Instruments 
Real estate Real Estate Investment Trusts/services 
8 
Industrials 
& 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Electricity 
22 23 
Gas, Water and multi utilities 
Construction 
and Materials Construction and Materials 
Industrial Goods 
and Services 
Aerospace and defence 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 
Industrial Engineering 
Industrial Transportation 
Support Services 
 
TOTAL     99 100% 
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Table A2: List of suspended or delisted securities from the JSE in 2010 
ELEMENTONE LIMITED 2010/01/11 
FIRSTRAND LIMITED 2010/01/11 
AQUARIUS PLATINUM LIMITED 2010/01/19 
MUTUAL & FEDERAL INSURANCE COMP LD 2010/02/08 
KIWARA PLC 2010/02/10 
EUREKA INDUSTRIAL LIMITED 2010/03/08 
EMERGENT PROPERTIES LIMITED 2010/03/08 
IMPERIAL BANK LIMITED 2010/03/12 
S&J LAND HOLDINGS LIMITED 2010/04/26 
SET POINT GROUP LIMITED 2010/05/25 
MAKALANI HOLDINGS LIMITED 2010/06/01 
CAPE EMPOWERMENT TRUST LIMITED 2010/06/01 
DTH DYNAMIC TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD 2010/09/14 
ABE CONSTRUCTION CHEMICALS LIMITED 2010/09/28 
GOODHOPE DIAMONDS (KIMBERLEY) LTD 2010/10/04 
BEIGE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2010/10/26 
KIMBERLEY CONSOLIDATED MINING LTD 2010/11/08 
CIC HOLDINGS LIMITED 2010/11/16 
WOOLTRU LIMITED 2010/11/16 
WOOLTRU LIMITED 2010/11/16 
WOOLTRU LIMITED 2010/11/22 
PBT GROUP LIMITED 2010/11/29 
DIMENSION DATA HOLDINGS PLC 2010/12/14 
HEALTH STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS LTD 2010/12/20 
 
Table A3: List of suspended or delisted securities from the JSE in 2011 
BARNARD JACOBS MELLET HOLDINGS LD 2011/01/04 
SPESCOM LIMITED 2011/01/25 
MARSHALL MONTEAGLE PLC 2011/02/28 
INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMP AFR HLDGS LD 2011/03/22 
PANGBOURNE PROPERTIES LIMITED 2011/04/05 
GLENRAND MIB LIMITED 2011/04/28 
MVELAPHANDA RESOURCES LIMITED 2011/06/07 
BEGET HOLDINGS LIMITED 2011/06/13 
BEST CUT LIMITED 2011/06/13 
HYPROP INVESTMENTS LIMITED 2011/10/17 
UCS GROUP LIMITED 2011/10/25 
PALADIN CAPITAL LIMITED 2011/10/25 
UNIVERSAL INDUSTRIES CORP LTD 2011/11/01 
VOX TELECOM LIMITED 2011/11/15 
MERCHANT & INDUSTRIAL PROP LIMITED 2011/11/22 
PARACON HOLDINGS LIMITED 2011/12/06 
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SALLIES LIMITED 2011/12/20 
ANGLORAND HOLDINGS LIMITED 2011/12/20 
SAAMBOU HOLDINGS LIMITED 2011/12/28 
FREEWORLD COATINGS LIMITED 2011/12/29 
 
Table A4: List of suspended or delisted securities from the JSE in 2012 
PLATMIN LIMITED 2012/01/03 
MVELAPHANDA GROUP LIMITED 2012/01/04 
AFRICAN BRICK CENTRE LIMITED 2012/01/10 
METOREX LIMITED 2012/01/17 
KAIROS INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/02/13 
DIALOGUE GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/02/13 
REAL AFRICA HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/03/14 
INTERTRADING LIMITED 2012/03/19 
MERCANTILE BANK HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/05/22 
O-LINE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/07/03 
OPTIMUM COAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/07/09 
MINE WASTE SOLUTIONS (PTY) LTD  2012/08/01 
CAPEVIN INVESTMENTS LIMITED 2012/08/13 
PRESCIENT LIMITED 2012/08/20 
AVUSA LTD 2012/09/26 
BEIGE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/10/03 
EXCELLERATE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/10/09 
M CUBED HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012/11/19 
IQUAD GROUP LIMITED 2012/11/27 
CERAMIC INDUSTRIES LIMITED 2012/11/27 
S A FRENCH LIMITED 2012/12/03 
REDEFINE PROP INTERNATIONAL LTD 2012/12/03 
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Table A5: List of suspended or delisted securities from the JSE in 2013 
SALLIES LIMITED 2013/01/02 
NEW AFRICA INVESTMENT LIMITED 2013/01/30 
NEW AFRICA INVESTMENT LIMITED 2013/01/30 
QUEENSGATE HOTELS & LEISURE LIMITED 2013/02/18 
HARDWARE WAREHOUSE LIMITED 2013/02/26 
SIMMER AND JACK MINES LIMITED 2013/04/16 
JCI LIMITED 2013/04/16 
ZAPTRONIX LIMITED 2013/04/30 
CAPE EMPOWERMENT LIMITED 2013/05/14 
ELB GROUP LIMITED 2013/05/14 
NEW BOND CAPITAL LIMITED 2013/06/04 
CLOVER INDUSTRIES LIMITED 2013/06/04 
AMALGAMATED APPLIANCE HOLDINGS LD 2013/07/02 
REUNERT LIMITED 2013/07/02 
THABEX LIMITED 2013/07/09 
CIPLA MEDPRO SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED 2013/07/16 
MOBILE INDUSTRIES LIMITED 2013/07/16 
RGT SMART MARKET INTELLIGENCE LTD 2013/07/30 
MUVONI TECHNOLOGY GROUP LTD 2013/07/30 
LONRHO PLC 2013/08/05 
ALLIED TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED 2013/08/20 
AG INDUSTRIES LIMITED 2013/08/27 
SABLE HOLDINGS LIMITED 2013/09/03 
IFA HOTELS AND RESORTS LIMITED 2013/09/10 
BUSINESS CONNEXION GROUP LIMITED 2013/10/08 
URANIUM ONE INC 2013/10/22 
REDEFINE PROP INTERNATIONAL LTD 2013/11/04 
RACEC GROUP LIMITED 2013/11/05 
MVELASERVE LIMITED 2013/11/12 
KAGISO MEDIA LIMITED 2013/12/10 
FIRST URANIUM CORPORATION 2013/12/24 
 
